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Washington Mutual Bank, fsb, successor in interest to Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, ("Prudential"), the Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant in 
the above-captioned case, submits this reply brief pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. Federal Regulations Governing Prudential Preclude All Claims for Interest 
on the Reserve Account. 
Madsens' claims are barred because federal regulations governing Prudential (as a 
federal savings and loan association) preclude all claims for interest on the reserve 
account, and those regulations preempt conflicting state law. 
1. Madsens Do Not Dispute the Substance of Prudential's Preemption 
Argument. 
Prudential's initial brief explains that a regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (1976), provides that, for loans made after June 16, 1975, 
a federal savings and loan must pay interest on escrow accounts only if required by a 
specific state statute. For all other loans, a federal association has "no obligation to pay 
interest on escrow accounts," "except as provided by contract." Id. That regulation 
merely clarified existing law. See 12 C.F.R. § 544.1(a) and (b) (1975) (federal savings 
and loan associations are "not required to distribute earnings on short-term savings 
accounts"); 12 C.F.R. § 541.5 (1975) (defining "short-term savings account" to include 
"a savings account in a federal association established for the purpose of accumulating 
funds to pay taxes or insurance premiums, or both, in connection with a loan on the 
security of a lien on real estate."). These regulations definitively preclude Madsens' 
claims. See Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant (hereafter "Prudential's Initial Brief) 
at 12-15. 
Madsens5 response to Prudential's federal preemption argument is solely a 
procedural argument. Madsens argue that the issue of federal preemption was decided in 
the 1977 Utah Supreme Court decision in this case. See Madsens' Reply Brief of 
Appellants and Brief of Cross-Appellees (hereafter "Madsens' Reply Brief) at 1-3. 
However, as discussed below, Madsens' procedural argument fails. 
Significantly, Madsens have made no attempt to dispute the substantive effect of 
the federal regulations and the preemption doctrine. 
2. Madsens5 Procedural Argument Regarding Preemption Fails. 
a. The Utah Supreme Court (Madsen I) Did Not Decide the Issue of 
Preemption. 
As explained more fully in Prudential's Initial Brief, the 1977 decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in this case did not determine the issue of federal preemption. Rather, 
that decision reversed and remanded summary judgment in favor of Prudential due to the 
existence of factual issues unrelated to the issue of federal preemption. See Madsen v. 
Prudential Federal Sav. & Loan Ass n, 558 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Utah 1977) ("Madsen T). 
The decision in Madsen I did not address federal preemption in any way, or any other 
affirmative defenses that could be raised by Prudential, but merely held that the "essential 
elements of a pledge" existed, and remanded for further proceedings. See Id. at 1339-40. 
In support of their argument that the issue of federal preemption was decided in 
Madsen /, Madsens cite Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930). 
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However, Madsens' reliance on Grubb is not helpful. Grubb deals with a prior final 
judgment m a state court case involving parties to the federal case that was being 
appealed. Thus, Grubb analyzes the res judicata effect of a final judgment in a separate 
case. Id at 47'5. 
By contrast, res judicata is inapplicable in the present case. Rather, as explained 
in Prudential's Initial Brief, the effect of the decision in Madsen I is analyzed under the 
"law of the case" doctrine. See Prudential's Initial Brief at 16-18. "The law of the case 
doctrine does not bar a later court from considering matters that 'could have been, but 
were not, raised and resolved in the earlier proceeding.'" Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 
553, 556 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Barge W-701, 654 F.2d 1164, 
1169 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). "[W]hen further proceedings 
follow a general remand, the lower court is free to decide anything not foreclosed by the 
mandate issued by the higher court." Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Intern. Ass 'n. Local 
No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1993). In any event, Grubb states that the res judicata 
effect of the prior judgment arose because the opinion in the prior case "leaves no doubt 
that the court regarded" the claim "and on that basis affirmed it." Id at 478. In this case, 
the decision in Madsen /reversed the summary judgment that had been granted in favor 
of Prudential. The Utah Supreme Court did not order that Madsens' cross-motion for 
summary judgment be granted, but remanded for further proceedings. Thus, Madsens 
cannot say that this reversal "leaves no doubt" that all defenses of Prudential were 
disposed of by the opinion in Madsen L 
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Significantly, Madsens' Reply Brief makes no attempt to respond to the Utah case 
law regarding the "law of the case," and in particular the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Dunlap v. Stitching Mayflower Mountain Foods, 119 P.3d 302 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005) ("Dunlap IF), a quiet title action. 
As explained in Prudential's Initial Brief, in Dunlap I, the trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Dunlap based on the chain of title established by a 1941 
foreclosure and denied Dunlap's motion for summary judgment on its adverse possession 
claim. See Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Foods, 76 P.3d 711, 713 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2003) ("Dunlap i"). Mayflower appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding that "Mayflower's chain of title . . . is superior to that of the Dunlaps." 
Id. at 715. After remand, Mayflower argued that Dunlap /had effectively resolved all 
issues and mandated that the trial court simply quiet title in Mayflower. Dunlap II, 119 
P.3d at 303. In Dunlap II, the Court of Appeals held that, although the decision in 
Dunlap I determined that Mayflower's chain of title was superior to Dunlap's, the 
decision "did not foreclose the possibility that the Dunlaps may challenge Mayflower's 
preeminent status as record title holder on such legal theories as adverse possession. . . ." 
Id. at 305. The Court of Appeals further explained that: 
Likewise, our decision in Dunlap I can only be appropriately read as reversing the 
decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the Dunlaps [and] 
remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. We 
stopped short of ordering the trail court on remand to enter judgment quieting title 
in Mayflower and dismissing all other claims asserted in the litigation. Our 
reversal of the trail court's grant of summary judgment in favor of one party on 
cross-motions for summary judgment does not imply that the trial court is 
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therefore bound to grant the other party's cross-motion for summary judgment on 
remand, especially when other issues may be outstanding. 
Id. at 304 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Gaddis Inv v. Morrison, 289 P.2d 
730 (Utah 1955) (reversing and remanding because the trial court had not made findings 
concerning whether the broker had abandoned its rights leaving open the possibility that 
the trial court "could reasonably find that there either was or was not an abandonment."). 
In the present case, the preemption issue was not addressed or decided in the 
opinion in Madsen I. The trial court ruling granting summary judgment that was 
appealed did not mention federal preemption. R. 475-76,479-80. Neither Prudential's 
brief on appeal in Madsen /, or Madsens' reply brief in Madsen I discussed preemption. 
R. 1766-92; 1798-1808. The Utah Supreme Court decision in Madsen I dots not address 
the issue. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court's reversal and remand in Madsen I did 
not order judgment in Madsens' favor, but merely reversed summary judgment that had 
been granted in favor of Prudential on the basis that Madsens' pledge theory created 
factual issues. Thus, Madsen I did not rule on any of Prudential's affirmative defenses, 
including federal preemption. 
b. The Tenth Circuit {Madsen II) Did Not Decide the Issue of 
Preemption. 
Madsens erroneously argue that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals "has squarely 
ruled against Prudential's defenses." See Madsens' Reply Brief at 3. This is not correct 
The Tenth Circuit decision reversed summary judgment that had been granted in favor of 
Prudential, but that reversal was based solely on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
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did not rule on the substance of any defense raised by Prudential. See Madsen v. 
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n.9 635 F.2d 797, 801 (10th Cir. 1980) {"Madsen IF). 
The context of the Tenth Circuit decision is that, after the Utah Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the trial court in 1977, Madsens amended their complaint. The 
procedural history and the holding are succinctly described by the Tenth Circuit, as 
follows: 
In October 1977, the Madsens amended their complaint to ask for an accounting 
and recovery of the profits earned by Prudential on the escrowed amounts. This 
amended complaint added a defendant class of lenders with similar escrow 
arrangements. 
Meanwhile in April 1977, Prudential filed a separate action for declaratory 
relief in federal court, asserting that under 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(c) (hereinafter 
referred to as section 545.6-11(c)), it is not required to pay interest or account to 
the Madsens on the escrowed funds. The complaint based jurisdiction on 28 
U.S.C. § 1337 and sought a declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties 
to the trust deed. When the Madsens amended their state complaint, Prudential 
promptly filed a removal petition, alleging that the relief requested arises under 
and is controlled by federal law. The Utah Bankers Association, a trade 
association of commercial banks domiciled in Utah, intervened in the action, and 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board filed an amicus curiae brief. The federal 
court denied the Madsens5 motion to remand the case, consolidated the removed 
action and the declaratory judgment suit, and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Prudential. 
On appeal, the Madsens contend, inter alia, that the federal court lacks 
jurisdiction over either the removed case or the declaratory judgment action. We 
agree, and reverse with directions to remand the removed action to state court and 
to dismiss the declaratory action. 
Id. at 799-800. 
Thus, the issue on appeal to the Tenth Circuit was whether the federal court had 
jurisdiction of the removed action. "Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
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and Section 1337 because the cause of the action allegedly arose under the laws of the 
United States and Acts of Congress regulating commerce." Id. at 800. The Tenth Circuit 
explained that in order for a cause of action to "arise under" federal law: 
[T]he required federal right or immunity must be an essential element of the 
plaintiffs cause of action, and the federal controversy must be 'disclosed upon the 
face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.' It is 
beyond argument that a defense predicated upon federal law is not enough by 
itself to counter federal jurisdiction, even though the defense is certain to arise. 
Id. at 800-01 (citations omitted). Thus, federal question jurisdiction existed, according to 
the Tenth Circuit, only if Madsens' Complaint raised the federal question, not 
Prudential's defenses. Id. at 801. Applying these principles, the Tenth Circuit found a 
lack of federal question jurisdiction, explaining: 
Although construction of the federal regulation cited by Prudential may be 
relevant to the defense Prudential asserts, i.e., that section 545.6-11(c) does not 
require payment of interest, the meaning of the regulation is absolutely irrelevant 
to the Madsens' theory of recovery. Because the Madsens have predicated their 
suit upon rights created under state law, the fact that federal regulations may create 
a defense to recovery on such a claim is immaterial to a finding of federal question 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 801.* Thus, the Tenth Circuit decision did not reach the substance of any federal 
defense raised by Prudential, but rather expressly acknowledged that those defenses were 
yet to be heard. 
B. The Trial Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Supreme Court's Decision in 
Madsen I Causing it to Improperly Exclude Evidence of a "Special 
Agreement" Regarding the Use of the Pledged Monies. 
1. Prudential Preserved the Issue of a "Special Agreement" for Appeal. 
The Tenth Circuit explained that the same reasoning applied to Prudential's declaratory 
judgment action because that action was "defensive m nature." Id. at 804. 
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Madsens argue that Prudential did not preserve the issue of whether the trial court 
improperly excluded evidence that there existed a special agreement between Madsens 
and Prudential. This argument is without merit and contrary to the record in this case. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, "the issue must be presented to the trial court in 
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002). Utah courts look to the 
following three factors in determining whether the trial court had such an opportunity: 
"(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; 
and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. 
{quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). Under this 
standard, "once trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court 
has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal." Id. 
Madsens assert that the only offer of proof on this issue was a statement made at 
trial by Prudential's counsel, Joseph Palmer. See Madsens' Reply Brief at p.4. In fact, 
Prudential raised the issue of a special agreement at various times before trial. For 
example, in its "Memorandum in Opposition to: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed on February 7, 1985," Prudential specifically listed various arguments 
"[it] still asserts," including that there was a special agreement with the Madsens. 
R. 1455. In its "Memorandum on the Utah Supreme Court Opinion," Prudential, in 
discussing its affirmative defenses, stated that "[a]side from Prudential's claim that there 
was a 'special agreement'.. . ." R. 1703. These are just two examples of instances where 
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Prudential raised the special agreement issue before trial. 
More importantly, the trial court recognized that Prudential timely raised the issue 
of a special agreement, that the issue was specifically raised, and that Prudential offered 
supporting evidence. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated March 22, 
1990, the trial court stated that: 
Prudential timely reserved the following issues in this case: 
(a) Whether the parties intended earnings to be paid or whether, considering 
all circumstances, including their conduct, the benefit the Madsens received, and 
the industry custom and practice, they intended a special agreement that earnings 
not be paid. 
R. 2996 (emphasis added). The trial court next stated that "Prudential made the 
following offer of proof to support their affirmative defenses," and then listed various 
documents that Prudential offered. R. 2996-97. Finally, the trial court said that the 
"offer of proof was received and denied. Rather, the court limited the scope of this trial 
to whether Prudential had earned a profit from the use of the pledged funds, and if so, for 
an accounting of those profits." R. 2997. Thus, the trial court expressly recognized that 
Prudential timely and specifically raised the issue of a special agreement, that it 
introduced evidence in support, and that the trial court limited the scope of the trial. 
Therefore, Prudential has met its burden for preserving the special agreement issue for 
appeal. See Brookside, 48 P.3d at 872. 
Madsens also place great emphasis on the fact that the trial court's Order dated 
September 3, 1985, is unsigned. This emphasis is misguided for various reasons. First, 
as discussed above, Prudential clearly preserved the issue of a special agreement for 
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appeal. Second, the Order in question was prepared and submitted by the Madsens and 
approved and signed by Prudential demonstrating that both parties believed it accurately 
reflected the trial court's ruling. Lastly, the trial court cites to this very Order in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law demonstrating that the trial court also felt that it 
accurately reflected its ruling with regards to, among other things, the special agreement 
issue. See, e.g., R. 2997. Thus, even though it was filed unsigned, the September 3, 1985 
Order is still relevant for demonstrating that Prudential did in fact preserve for appeal the 
issue of whether there was a special agreement with the Madsens. 
2. Madsens' Argument Regarding an Express Contract is Irrelevant. 
Madsens state without support that in any event a special agreement would need to 
be an "express contract." See Madsens' Reply Brief at 4-5. Although this is an issue of 
fact that would need to be decided by the trial court, and is irrelevant to determining 
whether a specific issue has been preserved for appeal, Prudential is compelled to 
respond. 
In support of their proposition that a special agreement must be an "express 
contract" Madsens cite to Fitzpatrickv. Vermont State Treasurer, 475 A.2d 1074 (Vt. 
1984), which is a Vermont case interpreting a Vermont statute relating to the Vermont 
Employee's Retirement System. In Fitzpatrick, the Vermont Supreme Court had to 
consider whether the Plaintiff qualified as an "employee" for purposes of eligibility for 
membership in the state's retirement system. The term "employee" was defined in 3 
V.S.A. § 455(a)(9) as excluding "any person engaged under retainer or special 
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agreement." Id, at 1076. In its holding, the court stated that a special agreement, "as 
contemplated in 3 V.S.A, § 455(a)(9), may be defined as one containing express 
provisions not found in the ordinary agreement relating to the employment of state 
employees.. . ." Id, at 1077-78 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue in Fitzpatrick was 
whether the plaintiff was engaged under a "special agreement" as that term is used 3 
V.S.A. § 455(a)(9) and in no other context. Fitzpatrick has no applicability to this 
proceeding and Madsens have offered no evidence that a special agreement, in the 
context of this case, must be an "express contract." 
3. Madsen I Clearly States that an Accounting is Necessary Only in the 
Absence of a Special Agreement. 
In Madsen I, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a pledgee has a duty to account 
for profits from the use of a pledge "in the absence of a special agreement to the 
contrary." Madsen, 558 P.2d at 1340 (citing Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co,, 16 P.2d 
234 (Utah 1938)). The trial court, however, prohibited Prudential from presenting any 
evidence of a special agreement, which represents an incorrect interpretation of Madsen I, 
Prudential should have been allowed to present evidence of a special agreement with 
Madsens, arising out of the conduct of the parties, the benefit Madsens received and 
industry custom and practice, and Prudential preserved this issue for appeal. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Class Certification Under Rule 
23(b)(1)(A). 
1. The Utah Supreme Court (Madsen III) Did Not Decide the Issue, 
In response to Prudential's argument that the class was not properly certified, 
Madsens argue that the 1988 case of Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav, & Loan Ass'n, 161 
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P.2d 538 (Utah 1988) {"Madsen III") decided this issue. Madsens' Reply Brief at 5. 
However, the issue in Madsen III had nothing to do with the propriety of class 
certification. Rather, the issue in Madsen III was the correctness of the district court's 
ruling that "Judge Rigtrup had no actual bias, but did have an appearance of bias." Id. at 
539. The portion of Madsen III on which the Madsens rely is dicta, and the remainder of 
the quoted portion (which Madsens do not quote) makes clear that it was included only to 
indicate that Judge Rigtrup was not a class member, stating "Prudential does not argue, 
and we find nothing in the record to indicate, that Judge Rigtrup is a member of that 
class. While it is true that the Madsens did seek to enlarge the class, a new plaintiff class 
has never been certified. Allegations alone do not act to enlarge an existing class." Id. at 
547. Thus, it is incorrect to state that Madsen III determined the propriety of class 
certification. 
2. Actions for Damages Are Not Appropriate for Rule 23(b)(1)(A) 
Treatment. 
As explained in Prudential's Initial Brief, actions seeking damages, as Madsens 
seek, are inappropriate for certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Actions for damages do 
not present the possibility of inconsistent judgments establishing incompatible standards 
of conduct, because Prudential can pay damages, when awarded, and not pay, when not 
awarded. See e.g. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 391 F.2d 555, 559, 564 (2nd Cir. 
1968); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. District Ct} S.D. ofCal, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 
(9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, Flanagan v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 425 U.S. 911 
(1976); Natl Union v. MidlandBancor, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 681, 687 (D. Kan. 1994). 
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Madsens have completely failed to address these cases 
Madsens quote from Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) 
to support their argument that certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was appropriate. 
Amchem is a Rule 23(b)(3) case in which the Court, in dicta, gave examples of Rule 
23(b)(1)(A) cases, such as a utility and its customers, a government and a tax, or riparian 
water rights owners. The distinction between these examples and the cases cited by 
Prudential in which Rule 23(b)(1)(A) was found inapplicable, is that in the Amchem 
examples, the defendant has no legal or practical alternative other than to treat all 
potential class members alike (such as a government imposing a tax on its citizenry), 
while in a damages action, such as that pursued by Madsens, a defendant can choose 
which cases it concedes liability, which cases it Hf>«ir»e +^  ™„+ * J i • t 
j > ^ ii aesires to contest, and which cases it 
desires to settle, with no obligation to each plaintiff to treat them equally. 
Madsens also cite to Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol. Mining Co., 57 
Utah 88,192, P. 554, 674 (1920) to argue that Prudential is somehow obligated to treat 
all class members alike. Madsens' Reply Brief
 a t 6. However, Western Securities is not 
applicable here because that case relies on trust theories to support its conclusion. Id. 
The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' trust fhpn™ ^ ™, 
J J U U b i m e
° ry on numerous occasions. See 
supra atI.D.3. 
Madsens also cite to Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 
34 (D.S.D. 1974), a federal case from the District of South Dakota. Madsens' Reply at 6. 
However, Cass Clay is similarly inapplicable because, in that case, the court specifically 
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stated "I think it should be pointed out what the issue is not. The issue is not whether the 
class action is maintainable under 23(b)(1) " 63 F.R.D. at 35 (emphasis in original). 
Thus, Madsens have relied on a case that does not address the issue for which it was 
cited. 
Madsens also quote general statements from the Court in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1106 (Cal. 2005) regarding the utility of class actions. 
Discover Bank is irrelevant to the question of whether the present case was properly 
certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Discover Bank deals with the issue of the 
enforceability of a waiver of class action rights within an arbitration clause and does not 
in any fashion address the requirements of certification under any subdivision of Rule 23. 
3. The Issue is an Issue of Law. 
Madsens assert that class certification is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Madsens' Reply Brief at 8. However, on this point, Madsens are incorrect. 
Because Prudential does not challenge any factual findings, but raises only the proper 
application of the rules, this is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. See 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004). 
4. Improper Certification Means That No Certified Class Exists. 
Madsens contend that if this Court concludes that class certification was improper, 
"that simply opens the floodgates for some 10,000 Utah families to file brand new 
individual suits in Utah courts." Madsens5 Reply Brief at 7. However, in the thirty-year 
history of this case no other class members besides Madsens have asserted a claim 
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against Prudential, and evidence submitted by Prudential in 1985 shows that the vast 
majority of borrowers, when given the choice, elect the non-compensated reserve account 
about which Madsens complain. Thus, there is no evidence or reason to believe that a 
flood of suits will be filed. Even if that possibility existed, it does not change the 
impropriety of certification in this case. The effect of improper certification in this case 
is that no certified class exists. 
D. Compound Interest on the Damages Awarded is Inappropriate. 
1. Compounding of Interest is Contrary to Utah Law. 
Prudential's Initial Brief cites Utah appellate court decisions holding that 
"compound interest is not favored by the law" and simple interest is awarded "unless 
agreed otherwise by the parties." See Prudential's Initial Brief at 40-41, citing City of 
Hildale v. Cooke, 28 P.3d 697, 707 (Utah 2001); Watkins & Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 
613, 616 (Utah 1979); Estate Landscaping and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 793 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992) and Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 
P.2d 551, 555 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). Madsens do not refute or respond to any of these 
cases. Rather, Madsens quote from Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, 577 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19, for the proposition that "[cjonsistent with federal law" compounding of 
prejudgment interest "lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." Madsens' Reply 
Brief at 20. However, Wilcox is not applicable to this case. The plaintiff in Wilcox was 
the Liquidator for the Utah Insurance Department, seeking to recover voidable transfers 
under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. The trial court granted 
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judgment in favor of the Liquidator, including prejudgment interest on the voidable 
transfers at the Utah statutory rule of 10% per annum. On appeal, the court explained 
that, when interpreting the Utah Liquidation Act, "we look to the preference provisions of 
federal bankruptcy law, which have the same purpose as the preference provisions of the 
Liquidation Act.5' See Wilcox at f^ 47. Therefore, the court concluded "that the more 
appropriate prejudgment interest rate is the one applicable to preference claims under the 
federal bankruptcy law." Id. at 146. In further explaining the application of federal law 
to the Liquidator's action, the court explained, as quoted by Madsens, that under the 
federal law applicable to that case, the trial court has discretion whether to compound 
prejudgment interest. Id. at f 47. 
The decision in Wilcox has no relevance to the present action. No argument exists 
that federal bankruptcy preference law applies to the present case. Rather, any damage 
awarded to Madsens, and interest on those damages, is a matter of Utah state law. Thus, 
Madsens have not refuted the Utah law that opposes compounding of interest. 
2. Whether Compounding of Interest is Appropriate is an Issue of 
Law. 
The issue of whether compound interest is appropriate is an issue of law. Madsens 
argue that the award of compound interest was a factual conclusion. See Madsens' Reply 
Brief at 20-21. However, under Utah law, entitlement to prejudgment interest is a 
question of law. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000). Additionally, whether 
compounding of interest is appropriate is similarly a question of law. See Christensen v. 
Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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3. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Madsens' "Trust" 
Argument on Numerous Occasions. 
Madsens' reliance on trust theories to argue in favor of compounding interest was 
correctly rejected by the trial court on numerous occasions. See R. 3519 (see page 95 of 
the record index) ("The Court: It is a common law pledge that arose, debtor/creditor . . . 
it was not a fiduciary duty.") See also Utah Code Ann. § 7-7-22. ("[t]he relationship 
between an association and its account holders is that of debtor and creditor"); First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry, 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) ("the 
relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee is not of a fiduciary character."). 
Madsens rely on the 1920 decision in Western Securities Co. v. Silver King 
Consolidated Mining Co., 192 P. 664 (Utah 1920), for the general proposition that a 
pledgee is generally a trustee. Madsens' argument is overly simplistic. In a case with 
facts similar to the present case, the Court analyzed this "pledgee as trustee" argument, 
and rejected its application to the circumstance of mortgage reserve accounts. 
We must expressly reject plaintiffs argument that a trust is created 
because of use of the word "pledge" in the note. This pertains to the 
statement appearing in the note: "If such sums are held in trust or carried in 
a borrower's tax and insurance account, the same are hereby pledged 
together with any other account of the undersigned in the Association to 
further secure this indebtedness * * *." This contention is a complete 
oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary deductive 
reasoning. The syllogism is: Every pledge is a trust. This note contains a 
pledge. Therefore this note is a trust. However, the major premise is 
completely invalid. Every pledge is not a trust. Circumstances may arise 
in the course of any pledge situation in which some of the attributes of a 
trust appear; particularly with reference to management or reduction to 
possession of collateral. This is the type of situation which appears in the 
cases cited by plaintiff. A pledgee who does not deal properly with 
property of the pledgor in his possession may be charged with fiduciary 
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responsibility because he has become a constructive trustee or a trustee ex 
maleficio. However, this does not mean, and cannot mean, that every 
pledgee is a trustee of an express trust. 
It is true, as plaintiff argues, "* * * that the general property or title 
to the property pledged remains in the pledgor * * *", subject to the lien or 
rights of the pledgee until the debt has been paid. But, this merely points 
up and emphasizes the distinction of a pledge from the case at bar. Here, 
when monthly payments were made, the mortgagor divested himself of all 
rights to the amount paid and relied directly and solely upon the contractual 
obligation of defendant to pay insurance and taxes. It could be argued with 
greater force, and with considerably more logic, that the language, "If such 
sums are held in trust or carried in a borrower's tax and insurance account * 
* *" accentuates the absence of trust attributes from the second option 
because it specifically states the trust or first option as one alternative and 
the borrower's account as the second. 
One further attribute of the transaction negatives with finality the 
possibility that the second option resulted in a trust relationship. As shown, 
these monthly payments were made by plaintiff and other borrowers 
virtually without recourse beyond their right to pro tanto payment of taxes 
and insurance. When the payments were made, the borrowers retained no 
specific property rights in any of the sums thus paid. They retained no right 
to refund of any portion of any payment. The payment was unconditional 
except for a contractual right vested in the borrower to have the taxes and 
insurance paid to the extent of the total of the monthly payments. Plaintiff 
had no property rights beyond this in any payment after it was made. The 
"borrower's tax and insurance account" simply provided an easy method 
for ascertainment of the amount available for taxes and insurance at any 
given time. It is ancient and basic trust law that a res or specific property is 
essential for the existence of a trust. Since no property right was retained 
by plaintiff in payments after made, it must necessarily follow that no trust 
was created. 
Sears v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 275 N.E. 2d 300, 305-06 (111. App. 1971) 
(citations omitted). 
In this case, there is no trust res. Rather, like in Sears, the Madsens retained only 
the right to require that the money be used for taxes and insurance, or otherwise 
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accounted for, and the elements of a trust are not present. 
In any event, the claim that Madsens argued before the Utah Supreme Court in 
1977 and presented for trial in 1985 was a claim for unjust enrichment, and Madsens 
specifically disavowed any trust theory. In Madsens' Reply Brief on Appeal, dated 
October 17, 1977, submitted to the Utah Supreme Court, Madsens stated "Madsen has 
not urged any trust theory in this Court." R. 1806. The Utah Supreme Court decision in 
this case makes no mention of fiduciary duty but states that, if profits are realized on the 
pledged funds, the lender must account, presumably to prevent unjust enrichment. See 
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc., 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977). 
II. CONCLUSION 
Madsens' appeal should be denied. Prudential's cross-appeal should be granted, 
and Madsens' claims dismissed based on federal regulations that bar Madsens' claims. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 2007. 
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